Seeking Rights, Not Rent: How Litigation Finance Can Help Break Music Copyright\u27s Precedent Gridlock by Chappell, Glenn E.
SEEKING RIGHTS, NOT RENT: HOW 
LITIGATION FINANCE CAN HELP BREAK 
MUSIC COPYRIGHT’S PRECEDENT GRIDLOCK 
GLENN E. CHAPPELL† 
ABSTRACT  
Since its inception, litigation finance has steadily grown in 
prevalence and popularity in the United States.  While many 
scholars have examined its merits, few have considered litigation 
finance specifically in the context of copyright law.  This is most 
unfortunate, for there, a vicious cycle has taken hold: high 
litigation costs discourage many market participants from taking 
cases to trial or summary judgment in order to vindicate their legal 
rights, even when they have strong cases. Thus, parties settle 
almost every case, which in turn prevents resolution of 
longstanding precedential questions in critical areas of copyright 
law.  The legal uncertainty resulting from this precedential 
gridlock generates higher avoidance costs and poses more 
financial risks for market participants, particularly less-heeled or 
less-established parties.      
This Note proposes one way in which litigation finance could 
help break that cycle.  Specifically, rights holders and defendants 
alike can use litigation finance to fund strategic-litigation 
campaigns to pressure the development of precedent.  To illustrate 
how this might work, this Note examines litigation finance in the 
narrow context of music copyright, an area that perfectly illustrates 
the problems besetting copyright law writ large.  In doing so, this 
Note flips a popular criticism of litigation finance on its head: 
while some scholars argue that litigation finance can distort 
litigation strategy by encouraging litigants to reject mutually 
beneficial settlements, it is normatively desirable to do so given the 
unsettled state of music copyright law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 It is well-established in innumerable contexts that “the squeakiest 
wheel gets the grease.”  But what happens when squeaking costs money—a 
whole lot of money, in fact?  Absent other factors, the inevitable result is 
that only the best-heeled wheels get the attention they seek.    
 Enter the contemporary civil litigation market.1  Owing to the high 
costs of discovery, expert witnesses, legal representation, and other factors, 
the cost of vindicating one’s legal rights in civil court, either as plaintiff or 
defendant, has steadily increased for more than two decades.2  And 
copyright claims have not been spared from this trend.  In fact, some argue 
that high litigation costs are particularly vexatious for copyright litigants.3    
 But the market has not gone gently into that good night.  Instead of 
surrendering civil litigation entirely to the province of the most gilded rights 
holders, entrepreneurs have developed litigation finance as a means to 
facilitate greater access to cash for aspiring litigants of varying economic 
means.4  Under the litigation finance model, a prospective litigant—
                                                     
1 See Michael Zhang, The High Cost of Suing for Copyright Infringements, 
PETAPIXEL (June 4, 2015), http://petapixel.com/2015/06/04/the-high-cost-of-suing-
for-copyright-infringements (discussing how high litigation costs discourage suing 
even obvious copyright infringers). 
2 See Lawyers for Civil Justice, Civil Justice Reform Grp. & U.S. Chamber Inst. for 
Legal Reform, Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies, Statement for 
Presentation to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference 
of the United States at Duke Law School 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation 2 
(May 10–11, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/litigation_cost_ 
survey_of_major_companies_0.pdf (noting steady increases from 2000 to 2008 and 
observing that American corporations spend far more on litigation than 
corporations in other countries).   
3 See, e.g., David Walker, Daniel Morel and the High Cost of Copyright 
Infringement Claims, PHOTO DISTRICT NEWS (June 3, 2015), 
www.pdnonline.com/features/Daniel-Morel-and-the-High-Cost-of-Copyright-
Infringement-Claims (noting “the costs of pursuing copyright claims—especially 
against wellfunded [sic] opponents—can far exceed the maximum damages that 
plaintiffs can recover under the law,” and that “[t]he law is structured so there’s 
little incentive for attorneys to take on a copyright case even if it appears to be a 
drop-dead winner” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a copyright 
plaintiff’s attorney)). 
4 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171, 
173–74 (2014) (“Litigation finance enables the top-flight lawyer at an hourly fee 
firm to represent a small plaintiff with a meritorious claim even if the client cannot 
afford his or her hourly bills and his or her firm refuses to agree to contingent fee 
arrangements.”); Charles Agee, Litigation Finance Considerations for Large 
Corporate Clients, WESTFLEET ADVISORS BLOG (Sept. 28, 2014), http://westfleet 
advisors.com/blog/litigation-financing-considerations-large-corporate-clients 
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presumably in response to either attorney referral or direct advertising—
contacts a litigation financing firm and applies for funding.5  Thereafter, an 
employee interviews the applicant to gather additional information, reviews 
the claim, assesses its merits and likelihood of success, and decides whether 
to fund the costs of the lawsuit.6  When they do award funds, most litigation 
finance firms do so on a nonrecourse basis, meaning that the firm will only 
collect its pre-negotiated return if the litigant wins the case.7  For plaintiffs, 
this usually includes a share of the judgment on top of attorney’s fees.8 For 
defendants, this usually means collecting an out-of-pocket interest premium 
from the defendant in addition to attorney’s fees.9  It is axiomatic, therefore, 
that risks are high for the funding entity.  As a result, most charge high 
interest rates to justify the risks of funding uncertain suits.10   
 Since its inception, litigation finance has steadily grown in 
prevalence and popularity, particularly in European nations.11  In the United 
States, while legal and ethical uncertainties may have initially hampered the 
model’s growth,12 the patchwork of ethical and legal restrictions casting 
doubt on its validity has loosened in recent years.13  As a result, litigation 
finance is now “booming” in the United States.14   
                                                                                                                       
(discussing how large corporations can use litigation finance to preserve capital for 
other investments). 
5 Mariel Rodak, Note, It’s About Time: A System’s Thinking Analysis of the 
Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 
506 (2006). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 506–07. 
8 Id. at 506. 
9 William Alden, New Firm Plans To Invest in Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Apr. 8, 2013, 7:24 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/new-firm-plans-
to-invest-in-lawsuits. 
10 Rodak, supra note 5, at 506. 
11 See George R. Barker, Third-Party Litigation Funding in Australia and Europe, 
8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 451, 522 (2012) (“The UK and certainly continental Europe 
can be considered more grown up about funding of large commercial disputes than 
the US.  Germany, Europe’s largest economy, has enjoyed an active and mature 
funding market for more than 10 years, which makes it—together with Australia—
one of the world’s early movers in this respect.”).  
12 See generally Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild 
West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
55 (2004) (canvassing the various legal and ethical obstacles—particularly state 
common law “champerty” doctrines—to litigation finance). 
13 See Carol Langford, Betting on the Client: Alternative Litigation Funding Is an 
Ethically Risky Proposition for Attorneys and Clients, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 237, 238 
(2015) (“Currently, twenty-seven out of fifty-one jurisdictions—including Arizona, 
Colorado, California, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Texas, and D.C.—permit 
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 Despite this rapid growth and the scholarly attention accompanying 
it, one question remains largely unexplored: what can the model do for 
music copyright?  This Note suggests that the strategic use of litigation 
finance can help copyright law “promote the progress”15 by enabling parties 
to vindicate their rights and break the current precedential deadlock in 
music copyright law.  This Note thus flips a popular criticism of litigation 
finance on its head: while some scholars argue that litigation finance can 
distort litigation strategy by encouraging litigants to reject mutually 
beneficial settlements, it is normatively desirable to do so given the current 
state of music copyright law.   
 This outcome is desirable because high costs should not shut out 
lesser-heeled parties—like new and less-known artists and indie labels—
from driving the development of legal precedent to further their interests.  
Rather, the practice of strategically pursuing litigation through to final 
judgment in multiple courts and jurisdictions to spur favorable precedential 
development (a type of judicial “rent seeking”16) is integral to American 
legal development, and there is strong historical precedent to light the path 
ahead.  Thus, by using litigation finance to fund otherwise cost-prohibitive 
lawsuits all the way through judgment, these stakeholders can use litigation 
finance to more effectively seek rent in the judicial process.  Put differently, 
less-heeled “wheels” in the music industry can use litigation finance to 
“squeak louder” in order to get the precedential grease. 
 Focusing on music copyright is justified for two reasons.  First, 
while scholars have written volumes about litigation finance in general, they 
have scarcely examined its impacts upon copyright law. Moreover, none 
have specifically considered music copyright, a legal field in particular need 
of precedential development and one that can serve as a model for legal 
development in other unsettled fields.  Second, music copyright exemplifies 
an area where rapid technological development has impacted and outpaced 
the law.  An examination of music copyright can therefore illustrate how 
litigation finance encourages precedential development in areas where 
technology demands greater judicial flexibility.     
                                                                                                                       
some form of champerty, so long as there is no intermeddling with how the 
litigation is conducted, the suit is not frivolous, and there is no malice champerty at 
play.”).  
14 See Jason Krause, Third-Party Financing Is Growing, and Lawyers Are Big 
Players, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2016, 2:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/ 
article/third_party_financing_is_growing_and_lawyers_are_big_players (“In May 
[2016], Burford Capital released results of an online survey showing 28 percent of 
responding private practice lawyers say their firms have used litigation financing, 
as compared to the 7 percent reported in 2013.”). 
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
16 See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
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 Part I of this Note briefly canvasses litigation finance’s historical 
and analytical background to provide context.  Part II introduces the concept 
of judicial rent seeking and, importantly, will distinguish the concept of 
legitimate rent seeking advocated here from the term’s more ominous 
meaning in other scholarship.  Part III explains music copyright law’s 
“precedent problem,” and then unites these threads by analyzing their 
applicability in, and utility to, music copyright. 
I. BACKGROUND: A PRIMER ON LITIGATION FINANCE 
A. A Brief History 
 Concerns about high litigation costs are nothing new.  Take, for 
example, “talking-machine” phonograph manufacturers who argued that 
what would eventually become the 1909 Copyright Act would 
unconstitutionally “plunge[]” them “into . . . long and expensive litigation 
as would necessarily ensue if this bill becomes a law.”17  Or take publishers 
who conversely argued that “[n]o single [musical] publisher” could afford 
“to carry on such an expensive litigation, because these music publishers are 
not the millionaires that our friends on the other side have attempted to 
point out and show,” and further that “no single composer would be able to 
supply the funds to carry on such a litigation.”18  And not only do concerns 
about parties’ financial positions as expositors of judicial success track the 
inception of federal copyright protection in the United States, they also 
track the common law development of litigation in Western nations 
generally.19  In sum, concerns about the cost of litigation are a time-honored 
tradition in the Western legal system.   
 The concept of third-party financiers as champions of the less-
resourced is not novel either.  In fact, the ancient common law doctrines of 
maintenance, champerty, and barratry were all developed in medieval 
England to regulate wealthy persons who funded others’ land-dispute 
claims in exchange for a share of the land they received at final judgment.20 
                                                     
17 Arguments Before the Comm. on Patents of the H.R., Conjointly with the S. 
Comm. on Patents, on H.R. 19853, To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting 
Copyright, 59th Cong. 157 (1906) (statement of Paul H. Cromelin, Vice President, 
Columbia Phonograph Co.). 
18 See id. at 203 (statement of Nathan Burkan, esq.) (discussing how expensive 
litigation is for poor composers). 
19 See M.J. Russell, Trial by Battle and the Appeals of Felony, 1 J. LEGAL HIST. 
135, 145 (1980) (noting that “hired champions”—mercenaries hired to fight in 
place of criminal defendants in trials by battle—were prohibited because they 
would tie the outcome of trials by battle on the parties’ relative financial positions 
instead of on divine adjudication of guilt or innocence). 
20 Michael Elliott, Note, Trial by Social-Media: The Rise of Litigation 
Crowdfunding, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 529, 541 (2016). 
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 However, the modern form of litigation finance developed much 
more recently.  The model was likely pioneered in Australia in the 1990s.21  
Owing largely to Australia’s legal and ethical framework, which was more 
favorable to the model than those of other nations, litigation finance steadily 
gained in popularity there in subsequent years.22  Since then, litigation 
finance has spread unevenly to other countries,23 but has gained traction in 
many European nations like England and Germany.24 
 In the United States, litigation finance was probably introduced by 
Las Vegas businessman (and felon) Perry Walton, the “self-proclaimed 
father of the modern litigation finance industry.”25  Thereafter, the model 
steadily increased in prominence and prevalence, aided by the parallel 
collapse of antiquated common law champerty doctrines and the like in 
many jurisdictions.26  That steady growth grew into a “boom” in the 2010s, 
with empirical studies suggesting that litigation finance firms have appeared 
and granted money during those years at levels exceeding those in previous 
decades by orders of magnitude.27  Today, the model continues to grow by 
embracing new sources of capital, including the increasingly pervasive 
populist-financing model known as “crowdsourcing.”28    
                                                     
21 Geoffrey J. Lysaught & D. Scott Hazelgrove, Economic Implications of Third-
Party Litigation Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice System, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
645, 648 (2012). 
22 See id. at 648–49 (explaining the ways in which Australia’s legal system 
promoted litigation finance and litigation finance’s corresponding popularity 
increase there). 
23 See id.at 649 (canvassing the development of litigation finance in Australia and 
its mixed reception in civil-law countries). 
24 See Barker, supra note 11, at 522 (“The UK and certainly continental Europe can 
be considered more grown up about funding of large commercial disputes than the 
US.  Germany, Europe's largest economy, has enjoyed an active and mature 
funding market for more than 10 years, which makes it—together with Australia—
one of the world's early movers in this respect.”). 
25 Rodak, supra note 5, at 505. 
26 See id. (citing Adam Liptak, Lenders to Those Who Sue Are Challenged on 
Rates: In Ohio Case, Court Says Fees Are Too High, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2003, at 
A15); Liptak, supra, at A15 (“[A]n erosion of the prohibition on investing in 
others’ lawsuits, or champerty, has helped create the industry.”). 
27 See Krause, supra note 14 (“In May [2016], Burford Capital released results of 
an online survey showing 28 percent of responding private practice lawyers say 
their firms have used litigation financing, as compared to the 7 percent reported in 
2013.”). 
28 See generally Elliott, supra note 20; Brian Willis, Crowdfunding Solar: Access to 
Populist Capital, TIGERCOMM: SCALINGGREEN (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://scalinggreen.tigercomm.us/2013/01/crowdfunding-solar-access-to-populous-
capital (“Crowdfunding is populism’s answer to the bank . . . .”). 
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B. Justifications for Litigation Finance 
 Proponents have advanced many arguments to justify litigation 
finance, and this Note does not attempt to review them all.  However, it is 
possible to sample the model’s principal advantages, grouped by three 
distinct justifications.      
 The first and most widely argued is that litigation finance opens 
courtroom doors for parties with limited financial means.29  Absent third-
party financing, parties who cannot afford to sustain litigation while waiting 
for their prospective settlement or award do not have the means to bring a 
suit.  That contingency fees exist to combat this problem does not 
undermine this argument, proponents assert, because litigation financing is 
a far more flexible and widely available option.30   
 Second, proponents argue that litigation finance enables assistance 
beyond the forwarding of costs to those who cannot afford to raise or 
defend against a claim.  For example, some point out that many litigation 
financiers also advance related funds like living expenses for tort victims 
deprived of job income during extended court battles.31  Others point to the 
                                                     
29 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 12, at 77 (“Litigation financing firms provide an 
option to plaintiffs with good cases but with meager or no financial resources.”). 
30 Professors David S. Abrams and Daniel L. Chen provide an excellent overview 
of the key differences between litigation financing and traditional contingency fees 
in David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical 
Look at Third Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075, 1079 (2013).  
They summarize those differences as follows:  
The most prominent difference is that the potential funder in the contingency fee 
system must be an attorney.  This can lead to some less desirable outcomes relative 
to litigation trading.  For example, limiting potential funders to attorneys 
necessarily restricts the liquidity of the market for litigation, meaning that some 
positive expectation claims still may not be pursued because of an inability to find 
financing. It also may skew the claims that do get funded in favor of those that fit 
the risk profile of litigators.  Many contingency-fee attorneys are unlikely to work 
on cases that have a low chance of success, even if the expected value is high.  The 
contingency fee system also ends up imposing a large cost on clients, usually in the 
range of thirty percent—an amount that could be substantially decreased in a more 
competitive market for funding. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
31 See Max Volsky, A Brief Introduction to Litigation Finance, LEXSHARES 2 
(2016), https://www.lexshares.com/Legal_Finance_Summary_Volsky.pdf (“The 
first [type of litigation financing agreement offered by LexShares] is the lawsuit 
advance for tort claims, which provides funding to individual plaintiffs for living 
expenses during protracted litigation.”). 
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fact that litigation financing allows less-resourced parties to hire more 
expensive and competent legal counsel.32  
 Finally, and most saliently, proponents argue that in regimes similar 
to American copyright, third-party financing serves an important function 
by allowing less-resourced litigants to overcome cost barriers to using the 
law as it was actually intended: to deter violators and protect the important 
interests of legal rights holders.33  In other words, where a legal system 
largely depends upon litigation to validate rights but that litigation is 
prohibitively expensive, access to cash is essential to the system’s 
operation.34  Proponents therefore assert that, by ensuring that access, 
litigation finance plays an important equalizing role.35    
C. Problems with Litigation Finance 
 Litigation finance has its warts, however.  Three are particularly 
noteworthy.  First is the specter of undue case influence.  Many 
commentators—including members of Congress—have expressed concern 
that financiers pose serious risks to parties’ decision-making and control of 
their cases.36  They contend that, regardless of financiers’ attestations to the 
                                                     
32 E.g., Radek Goral, Skin in the Game: Why Business Lawsuits Get Third-Party 
Funded, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 247, 247 (2015). 
33 Professor Syamkrishna Balganesh applies this argument specifically to the 
copyright realm:  
When individuals know that the costs of litigation make it unlikely that suits will be 
brought, the law’s ability to deter behavior begins to diminish in large measure. If 
litigation costs can influence a regime’s ability to deter behavior, they must in equal 
measure be able to influence a regime's ability to incentivize behavior as well. And 
if copyright’s primary purpose lies in providing creators with an incentive to 
create—as courts and policymakers routinely reiterate—then rising litigation costs 
will, in a similar vein, impede the system’s realization of its core objective. 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
2277, 2290 (2013) (footnote omitted). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 2291. 
36 See Sara Randazzo, Lawmakers Taking Closer Look at Litigation Funding, 
WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Aug. 27, 2015 4:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/08/ 
27/senators-call-for-transparency-in-litigation-funding (“While proponents of the 
“litigation finance” industry say it helps level the playing field for those who would 
otherwise be unable to pursue lawsuits, critics have long complained that such 
third-party investors give outsiders undue influence over legal decisions and allow 
frivolous lawsuits to go forward, driving up the overall cost of litigation.”); Letter 
from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm., & Sen. 
John Cornyn, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution, to Sir Peter Middleton, 
Chairman, Burford Capital 12 (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/ 
sites/default/files/judiciary/upload/2015-08-27%20CEG%2C%20Cornyn%20to 
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contrary, third parties whose financial success is directly tied to a case’s 
success are unavoidably more likely to meddle with the case’s 
management.37 
 Second, critics argue that litigation finance encourages frivolous 
litigation.38  This encouragement, they argue, stems from the fact that third-
party-funded claims do not benefit from the self-interested gatekeeping that 
attorneys working on contingency bases perform.39  In other words, purely 
out of economic self-interest, attorneys who front their own money to their 
clients are less likely to agree to pursue meritless cases. 
 Finally, critics argue that litigation finance has a distortionary effect 
on the settlement process.  They assert that the practice improperly 
influences settlement decisions by encouraging parties to eschew 
meritorious settlement offers in favor of pushing cases through to final 
judgment, even when settlement would otherwise be the most mutually 
beneficial option.  As they see it, “[a] plaintiff who must pay a finance 
company out of the proceeds of any recovery can be expected to reject what 
may otherwise be a fair settlement offer and hold out for a larger sum of 
money.”40   
                                                                                                                       
%20Burford%20Capital%20%28Commerical%20Litigation%20Funding%29.pdf 
(“[W]hile commercial litigation lenders maintain that plaintiffs retain control over 
litigation and settlement decisions, the terms and fundamental structure of 
agreements that are publicly available call into question these assertions.”). 
37 JOHN BEISNER, JESSICA MILLER & GARY RUBIN, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING 
TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S. 
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 7 (2009), http://www.instituteforlegalreform. 
com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf (“[L]itigation-financing 
arrangements undercut the plaintiff ’s control over his or her own claim because 
investors inherently desire to protect their investment and will therefore seek to 
exert control over strategic decisions in the lawsuit.”). 
38 Joanna M. Shepherd, Economic Conundrums in Search of a Solution: The 
Functions of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 919, 950 (2015). 
39 See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 37, at 5 (“What is more, third-party financing 
particularly increases the volume of questionable claims.  This is because, absent 
such financing, attorneys have two incentives not to permit their clients to bring 
such claims.  First, they have a duty to advise clients when potential claims would 
be frivolous.  And second, when lawyers are working on contingency, they 
obviously would rather spend their finite time on cases that are likely to be 
successful, as opposed to cases with a low probability of success.  Accordingly, 
absent third-party funding, cases that plaintiffs and their attorneys actually decide to 
file ordinarily can be expected to be of higher merit than cases that plaintiffs and 
their attorneys decide not to file.  When third-party litigation financing increases 
the overall volume of litigation, however, those weak cases that plaintiffs and their 
attorneys ordinarily would not have pursued are much more likely to be filed.”). 
40 Id. at 6. 
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 This concern has been borne out in at least one case, Rancman v. 
Interim Settlement Funding Corp.,41 where the Supreme Court of Ohio held 
that litigation financing constituted champerty and maintenance under Ohio 
law because it “provided Rancman with a disincentive to settle her case.”42  
In reaching its decision, the court observed that Rancman’s finance 
agreement with her litigation funder created “an absolute disincentive to 
settle” her case for less than $24,000 “because she would keep the $6,000 
advance” afforded her by their agreement, but “would not receive any 
additional money from a $24,000 settlement.”43  Thus, her only prospects 
for recovering more than the advance she received would be to win a 
judgment in excess of $24,000, while at the same time the guaranteed 
advance she already received ensured that she risked no financial loss by 
rejecting the otherwise fair settlement in favor of pursuing a heavier 
verdict.44 
*** 
 In sum, litigation finance presents both tantalizing litigation-
equalizing benefits and disturbing policy concerns.  In the next Part, this 
Note returns to these justifications and concerns to illustrate that litigation 
finance can be used for particularly meritorious ends in the realm of music 
copyright law. 
II. LITIGATION FINANCE AND MUSIC COPYRIGHT 
A. Copyright’s Precedent Problem 
 Copyright (and music copyright, by incorporation) has a precedent 
problem.  Legal standards ranging from fair use,45 to the de minimis 
defense46 in music sampling, to the degree of service-provider knowledge 
                                                     
41 Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003). 
42 Id. at 220. 
43 Id. 
44 See id. 
45 Compare Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705–06 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(“Transformative works lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of 
breathing space.” (alterations omitted) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994))), with Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 
756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 191 L. Ed. 2d 638 (2015) (“To say that a new 
use transforms the work is precisely to say that it is derivative and thus, one might 
suppose, protected under § 106(2).  Cariou and its predecessors in the Second 
Circuit do no [sic] explain how every ‘transformative use’ can be ‘fair use’ without 
extinguishing the author's rights under § 106(2).  We think it best to stick with the 
statutory list . . . .”). 
46 Compare VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(“We hold that the ‘de minimis’ exception applies to infringement actions 
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necessary to survive summary judgment in digital-content-infringement 
cases47 are inconsistent across the country, despite the fact that Congress 
sought to create a harmonious nationwide scheme when it passed a federal 
statute governing copyright.48 
 Sampling of sound recordings is a prime example of how this 
unsettled legal state impacts the music industry.  Although the practice of 
borrowing portions of others’ works is certainly nothing new,49 creative 
experimentation with sampling heated up dramatically in the 1980s and 
1990s when technology began to make it easier and cheaper to directly 
reproduce and manipulate sound recordings.50  Indeed, entire genres have 
since evolved around the art of creative sampling.51   
                                                                                                                       
concerning copyrighted sound recordings, just as it applies to all other copyright 
infringement actions.”), with Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 
792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Get a license or do not sample.”).   
47 Compare Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 97 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(holding that the fact that infringing works were being played on service-provider 
platforms even where “copyrighted music . . . was to some extent viewed (or even 
viewed in its entirety) by some employee of a service provider” was not sufficient 
to prove the actual or “red flag knowledge” necessary to invoke an exception to the 
DMCA’s service-provider safe harbor), with Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. 
Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1043 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The material in question was 
sufficiently current and well-known that it would have been objectively obvious to 
a reasonable person that the material solicited and assisted was both copyrighted 
and not licensed to random members of the public, and that the induced use was 
therefore infringing.”). 
48 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND 
RECORDINGS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 121 (2011), 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf (“National uniformity of 
copyright law ensures that all users, consumers, intermediaries, and right holders 
are operating under a single, consistent set of laws.”). 
49 See, e.g., Computer Music, A Brief History of Sampling, MUSICRADAR (Aug. 5, 
2014), http://www.musicradar.com/tuition/tech/a-brief-history-of-sampling-604868 
(noting that “digital sampling has been in existence since the 1960s”); Pàdraic 
Grant, Mainstream Sampling—Innovation & Scorn, PERFECT SOUND FOREVER 
(Oct. 2007), http://www.furious.com/perfect/sampling.html (observing that the 
early twentiethth-century classical genre known as “[m]usique concrete is perhaps 
the most useful as a starting point in the history of sampling” because it “was 
rooted in attempts at new forms of classical composition” that relied largely on “the 
utilisation and reinterpretation of existing material to create original works of art”). 
50 See Computer Music, supra note 49 (“Thanks to digital technology’s decreasing 
manufacturing costs, the first relatively cheap samplers began to appear in the mid-
to-late ’80s.”). 
51 See id. (noting that hardcore rave “couldn't have existed before the advent of the 
sampler”); Grant, supra note 49 (documenting how sampling was instrumental to 
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 But with those technological and creative advances came lawsuits.  
Those lawsuits revealed an uncertain interaction between copyright law and 
sampling of sound recordings.  Cases involving the de minimis defense52 
are illustrative.  The question arising in those cases is whether the de 
minimis defense is available at all in sampling cases.  The primary source of 
this disagreement arises from the language in 17 U.S.C. § 114, which states 
that sound recording rights “do not extend to the making or duplication of 
another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of 
other sounds.”53  The Sixth Circuit concluded that under a literal approach 
to that text, the word “entirely” suggests that artists cannot sample any 
portion of another’s work, regardless of how small that sample may be.54  In 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit concluded that under either approach—but 
particularly a purposive approach—that the passage was clearly intended as 
a rights-limiting provision suggests that the provision should not be read to 
substantially expand rights.55 Additionally, nothing in the language 
indicates an intention to abandon the de minimis exception solely with 
respect to sound recordings when it consistently applies throughout 
copyright law writ large.56   
 There are also policy disagreements.  Proponents of the defense 
maintain that sampling cases are no different than any other claims, and that 
the de minimis defense should therefore apply.57  In contrast, critics of the 
defense argue that sampling is more akin to physical theft because it 
involves brazenly using portions of others’ songs.58  Regardless of how 
these arguments should be resolved, the dispute demonstrates that the 1976 
Copyright Act’s text is unclear on the topic of sampling of sound 
                                                                                                                       
hip hop’s development, and noting that sampling was “a basis for some of the most 
interesting and revered music of its time”). 
52 The de minimis defense allows an alleged infringer to assert that the portions they 
copied from others’ works were too small or inconsequential to amount to 
copyright infringement.  See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–93 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (“For an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work to be actionable, the 
use must be significant enough to constitute infringement.”).   
53 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
54 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005). 
55 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 881–83 (9th Cir. 2016). 
56 Id. at 882. 
57 See, e.g., id. (“[N]othing in [the 1976 Copyright Act] suggests differential 
treatment of de minimis copying of sound recordings compared to, say, 
sculptures.”).  
58 See, e.g., Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 
182, 183, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (equating sampling to a violation of Moses’s 
Seventh Commandment, characterizing the practice as a “callous disregard for the 
law and for the rights of others,” and referring case to the U.S. Attorney to consider 
federal criminal prosecution). 
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recordings. This is unsurprising considering that the practice was virtually 
unheard of at the time the law was passed.59    
 Unsurprisingly, the circuits have not resolved this issue in a 
uniform manner.  The Sixth Circuit was the first to address the issue and 
held in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films60 that the de minimis 
defense is practically unavailable in sampling cases.61  Despite garnering 
volumes of scholarly and industry criticism,62 Bridgeport stood alone 
among circuit-court decisions on the de minimis question for a decade 
thereafter.            
 Furthermore, and perhaps even more confusing to the industry, 
precedential development is excruciatingly slow in the circuit courts.  
Sampling is again instructive.  After the Sixth Circuit’s controversial denial 
of the de minimis defense in Bridgeport, no circuit addressed the issue for 
over a decade.  Finally, in 2016, the Ninth Circuit created (yet another) 
circuit split in copyright by holding in VMG Salsoul v. Ciccione63 that the 
de minimis defense is in fact available in sampling cases.64  This decision—
though likely textually and logically correct—thus creates even more 
uncertainty throughout the nation over what constitutes music copyright 
infringement. As one commentator sarcastically exclaimed, “Let the forum 
shopping for music sampling copyright infringement claims and declaratory 
judgment actions begin!”65 
 In sum, while rapid technological progress has changed the ways in 
which artists create music and their fans listen to and buy that music, the 
contemporary state of music copyright law remains unsettled in important 
and perhaps even market-defining ways.  Simply put, the courts have not 
kept up. 
                                                     
59 See Computer Music, supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
60 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
61 Id. at 801. 
62 See generally, e.g., John Schietinger, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: 
How the Sixth Circuit Missed a Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 209 (2005) (positing numerous ways in which Bridgeport represents “a 
problematic and potentially harmful decision”). 
63 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016). 
64 Id. at 874. 
65 Mark H. Wittow & Eliza Hall, Sometimes Borrowing Isn’t Stealing: De Minimis 
Sampling of Music Sound Recordings Isn’t Copyright Infringement, Say Two Key 
Courts in the United States and Germany, K&L GATES (June 16, 2016), 
http://www.klgates.com/sometimes-borrowing-isnt-stealing-de-minimis-sampling-
of-music-sound-recordings-isnt-copyright-infringement-say-two-key-courts-in-the-
united-states-and-germany-06-16-2016. 
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B. How Litigation Costs Distort Music Copyright Law 
 Although many factors prevent the law from keeping up with 
technological and market changes in the music industry, high litigation 
costs are chief among them.  When parties almost always settle, courts have 
almost no opportunity to make precedent.  Because precedent makes the law 
more predictable for industry players, extremely frequent settlement distorts 
the law by feeding perpetual unpredictability.   
 That is exactly what is happening in music copyright law.  
Copyright cases are even more expensive than other types of already 
expensive civil cases, averaging greater than three times the cost of an 
average civil suit.66  In fact, the music industry has developed a series of 
risk-averse, prophylactic practices to avoid expensive litigation at all 
costs.67 These practices include “[n]eedless licenses, clearances, and 
permissions—which are expensive, but cost less than litigation.”68  
Shyamkrishna Balganesh asserts that these practices are “the norm among 
users and copiers, even when wholly unnecessary as a legal matter, and they 
are often motivated entirely by the impulse to avoid costly litigation.”69  
Further, defendants settle the vast majority of music copyright claims much 
earlier in the litigation process, largely to curb the cost of going to trial.70  
Charles Cronin recently explained that “[m]usic infringement claims tend to 
be settled early on, with financially successful defendants doling out 
basically extorted payoffs to potential plaintiffs rather than facing 
expensive, protracted and embarrassing litigation.”71  But high costs do not 
just alter the behavior of music copyright defendants.  They are just as 
likely to influence the litigation strategy of prospective plaintiffs.  In fact, 
citing empirical studies, Balganesh asserts that “[l]itigating a copyright 
claim is no longer an affordable prospect for a vast majority of authors and 
                                                     
66 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, 
at 35 (2011). 
67 Balganesh, supra note 33, at 2280. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See id. (“On the defendant side, users and copiers of creative works are, for 
identical reasons, all too reluctant to defend themselves in court when threatened 
with an infringement lawsuit, and go to extreme lengths to avoid the risk of being 
sued, even when their actions are fully defensible under copyright’s fair use 
doctrine.” (footnote omitted)). 
71 Ben Sisario & Noah Smith, ‘Blurred Lines’ Infringed on Marvin Gaye Copyright, 
Jury Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/ 
business/media/blurred-lines-infringed-on-marvin-gaye-copyright-jury-rules.html 
(quoting Mr. Cronin). 
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creators.”72  Thus, it is entirely reasonable to assume that many copyright 
holders choose, as a matter of pure economic necessity, to forego suing 
known infringers and thus leave violation of their legal rights unmitigated.73  
 More concerning, high copyright litigation costs—and the litigant 
behavior they coerce—generate far more insidious externalities: they are 
problematic for music copyright (and copyright law writ large) because they 
“have a distortionary effect on copyright law and policy.”74  In particular, 
they undermine copyright law’s central purpose to “promote the progress of 
the arts and sciences” in two ways.  First, they erode copyright owners’ 
faith in the legal system’s ability to vindicate the hard-won fruits of their 
creative labors.75  Second, they undermine defendants’ access to “safety 
valves—such as the fair use doctrine and other limitations and exceptions to 
exclusive rights”—by forcing defendants to adopt “litigation-avoidance 
strategies” and thereby abandon those defenses long before they are ripe for 
“judicial determination.”76   
 This cocktail of lost plaintiff faith in copyright law and defendant 
litigation avoidance at nearly any cost has caused, or at least contributed to, 
the disturbingly unsettled state of many aspects of music copyright law.  
They have done so by jointly breeding a circular system: prospective 
plaintiffs with limited financial backing are, by way of cash shortage and 
cloudy prospects of success, doubly dissuaded from bringing suits or 
fighting suits brought against them all the way to completion.  Further, 
well-heeled litigants can perpetuate this system by strategically negotiating 
pre-trial settlements to avoid undesired precedent and further pursuing only 
those cases that are economically advantageous or stand to benefit their 
                                                     
72 See Balganesh, supra note 33, at 2280 (“Litigating a copyright claim is no longer 
an affordable prospect for a vast majority of authors and creators.  As of 2011, the 
average cost of litigating a copyright infringement case through trial, for either 
plaintiff or defendant—excluding judgment and awards—was estimated to range 
from $384,000 to a staggering $2 million.  To individual, small business, or non-
commercial creators, all of who are intended beneficiaries of copyright, copyright 
litigation remains an unaffordable proposition.” (footnote omitted)). 
73 Cf. Lee Wilson, If You Want To Sue for Copyright Infringement, GRAPHIC 
ARTISTS GUILD, https://graphicartistsguild.org/tools_resources/if-you-want-to-sue 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2016) (“People who believe that their copyrights have been 
infringed often have no idea how complicated copyright infringement lawsuits are.  
This doesn’t mean that there are no issues worth going to court over—litigation is 
sometimes the only way to settle some disputes or to pursue that elusive goal, 
justice.  However, the U. S. judicial system is so complex that a lawsuit can leave 
you as bloodied as a fistfight; even if you win you are bruised by the experience.”).  
74 Balganesh, supra note 33, at 2280. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 2280–81. 
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positions.77  In either circumstance, the onus undeniably falls on settlement, 
rather than on developing precedent.  Given these realities, it should come 
as no surprise that the number of copyright lawsuits in America has 
consistently and dramatically fallen in recent years.78  Therefore, legal risk 
and uncertainty have ensued in force.  Litigants who do brave the 
treacherous, unexplored waters of music copyright litigation by taking their 
cases all the way to trial must truly sail into the unknown with little sense of 
their prospects for winning it all or losing their shirts.79 
III. HOW LITIGATION FINANCE CAN HELP 
A. Rent Seeking, Precedent, and Purposeful Ambiguity 
 Critics argue that litigation finance incentivizes litigants to reject 
what would normally be attractive settlements in favor of pursuing riskier 
but potentially more lucrative trial judgments.80  This externality, they 
argue, is not good for the courts and the justice system because more cases 
take up courts’ and parties’ time and further clog up already-sclerotic 
dockets.81  They contend that, coupled with its tendency to promote 
frivolous or at least less-than-meritorious lawsuits, litigation finance allows 
parties to exploit the judicial system for their own benefit while imposing 
harms on the rest of the system.82  
                                                     
77 See Casey Rae, Blurred (Legal) Lines?, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION (Mar. 11, 
2015, 3:35 P.M.), https://futureofmusic.org/blog/2015/03/11/blurred-legal-lines 
(“One thing that doesn’t get pointed out often enough in coverage of these high-
profile [music copyright] cases is that infringement lawsuits seem to be mostly 
available options to those with deep enough pockets to bring a legal action.  We’ve 
encountered a number of creators who don’t have the means to protect their works 
in the courts due to the high costs of litigation, despite much more clear-cut 
examples of infringement.  This is something that needs to be discussed.”). 
78 See Balganesh, supra note 33, at 2288–89 (“These costs have risen dramatically 
over the last decade, which has in turn seen a corresponding reduction in the 
number of copyright claims that are actually litigated in court.  In 2005, a total of 
5,796 new copyright cases were filed.  This figure has seen a steady decline since, 
and by 2011 this figure shrank to 2,297-an astounding sixty percent drop.  The 
Copyright Office attributes most of this to the rise in litigation costs . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted)).  
79 See Rae, supra note 77 (“When [music copyright] cases . . . go to jury, things can 
get very interesting and the outcomes are often unpredictable.”). 
80 E.g., BEISNER ET AL., supra note 37, at 6. 
81 Id. at 4. 
82 See id. (“Proponents of third-party litigation financing argue that the practice 
promotes access to justice.  But this focus on access to justice ignores an obvious 
point—third-party litigation funding increases a plaintiff’s access to the courts, not 
justice. . . .  Practices like third-party funding increase the overall litigation volume, 
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 Thus, they argue that litigation finance actually fosters an illicit 
form of judicial “rent seeking,” a form of path manipulation83 whereby an 
actor seeks to benefit his position through strategic participation in a 
political or legal system.84     
 But frequent settlement creates externalities too.  By design, the 
American legal system heavily depends on courts to develop precedent 
when applying broad statutes to discrete facts.85  In doing so, courts clean 
up messy drafting or unavoidable lingual inexactitude and keep statutes 
current by applying the principles of justice embodied within them to 
unforeseeable new scenarios wrought by technological or behavioral 
developments.86  Furthermore, precedent is important not just to litigants, 
but to markets.  That is because precedent begets legal clarity.  When the 
law is sufficiently clear and detailed, actors know when their behavior 
crosses legal boundaries.87  Economic legal regimes like copyright law are 
designed to govern business conduct; thus, when the law governing their 
transactions is sufficiently clear and detailed, businesses and market 
participants can contract, create, and sell without fear of legal retribution.88   
                                                                                                                       
including the number of non-meritorious cases filed, and thus effectively reduce 
(not increase) the level of justice in the litigation system.”). 
83 See Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not To Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions 
to the Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 613, 613 (2012) 
(discussing “the danger of path manipulation, a form of judicial rent-seeking” and 
explaining that “[i]n a system of binding precedent, litigation financiers will be 
faced with incentives to use case selection to maximize profits by pressuring the 
courts to open new areas of tort liability”). 
84 David R. Henderson, Rent Seeking, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA ECON. (2008), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentSeeking.html. 
85 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who 
apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that 
rule.”). 
86 See William D. Bader & David R. Cleveland, Precedent and Justice, 49 DUQ. L. 
REV. 35, 36 (2011) (“Precedent is the cornerstone of common law method, the 
conceptual vehicle allowing law and justice to merge as one.”); Anthony Ciolli, 
Bloggers as Public Figures, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255, 273 (2007) (“Courts and 
legislatures have altered common law precedents in the past when new 
developments, including technological advances, made following precedent 
impractical or undesirable.”).   
87 See Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 926 (2006) 
(“Precedent rules, when followed, settle controversy and enable individuals to 
coordinate their actions.”).   
88 Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign Affairs, 61 DUKE L.J. 941, 
954–55 (2012) (“Stability functions in tandem with predictability. Adherence to 
precedent establishes a framework for efficient public and private planning.”). 
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 But the system breaks down in a number of ways when settlement 
happens so often that it robs courts of flexibility to develop new 
precedent.89  Chief among those is that precedent can have the opposite 
effect: when precedent across jurisdictions is so infrequent that circuit splits 
and ambiguous questions of law linger for years, every new circuit decision 
can generate years of confusion when, as in music copyright law, the 
Supreme Court is unable or unwilling to step in and settle the issue.  The 
only parties that benefit from this are lawyers: forum shopping is 
inevitable.90  Indeed, one need look no farther than the current split over the 
de minimis doctrine in digital sampling to see this effect in full force.91  
And, as has been demonstrated, while litigation finance might sometimes 
incentivize rejection of fair settlement offers, high litigation costs often 
incentivize acceptance of unfair settlement offers.92  
 In addition to creating those externalities, prohibitive litigation 
costs themselves promote an inequitable form of rent seeking.  Specifically, 
they tend to preclude less-resourced market participants from using the 
judicial system to advance their interests.93  What results is a system in 
which parties with pockets deep enough to survive protracted litigation can 
spend strategically to obtain the precedent (or lack thereof) they want.  The 
current state of the music industry bears powerful witness to this: it is 
widely asserted that the litigation-avoidance regime built up around the 
unsettled nature of music copyright law strongly favors the largest and most 
well-established market participants.94  As has been discussed, this regime 
is not so much the result of unfavorable precedent as it is perpetually 
unclear law.95  But actors can seek rent by trying to perpetuate ambiguity 
just as much as they can by trying to obtain favorable precedent—especially 
when, as in music, perpetual ambiguity clearly favors one party over 
another.  All of these factors dictate that we must have what we do have: 
despite an unprecedented revival in indie labels and niche genres driven by 
                                                     
89 See Neil W. Averitt, The Elements of a Policy Statement on Section 5, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2013, at 3 (describing unpredictability concerns when 
“cases are too infrequent for precedents to accumulate rapidly enough”). 
90 Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the 
Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1183 (2012). 
91 See supra notes 52–65 and accompanying text. 
92 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
93 See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
94 See, e.g., Ankur Srivastava, The Anti-Competitive Music Industry and the Case 
for Compulsory Licensing in the Digital Distribution of Music, 22 TOURO L. REV. 
375, 399 (2006) (arguing that the music industry’s “[s]tructure” preserves major-
label “[m]onopoly [p]ower”).  
95 See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.  Though, interestingly, denying a 
de minimis exception as the Bridgeport court did mostly benefitted large, old labels 
with the most extensive catalogs. 
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technology platforms like YouTube and Kickstarter that make it 
exponentially easier to reach consumers and vie for funding, the legal 
regime under which this revival is happening has not kept pace with this 
redistribution of market forces. 
B. Countering Conventional Criticisms 
 In light of these realities, musicians should do exactly what 
litigation-finance critics say they should not: use litigation finance to 
pressure courts to develop precedent that benefits their personal interests.96  
While attempting to manipulate judicial decision makers for personal gain 
might seem deeply repugnant to notions of fairness at first glance, it is 
important to remember that the common law system of incremental 
adjudication is designed to accommodate—and indeed depends upon—
strong adversarial representation by self-interested parties.97  But when, as 
in music copyright law, litigation costs prohibit less-resourced parties from 
effectively aggregating their views across multiple cases and in multiple 
courts (both as plaintiffs and defendants), the system is volumetrically 
starved of that adverseness.  Conversely, litigation finance can mitigate this 
problem by providing the financial means for less-resourced parties to 
increase the number of cases they can afford to bring or defend, thereby 
strengthening their adversarial advocacy in the judicial system.  And this 
argument is not entirely abstract: one empirical study in Australia found that 
the model demonstrably increased the development of precedent in courts 
allowing litigation finance.98   
 Further, at least two additional considerations weigh in favor of 
viewing this as a benefit instead of a drawback, at least with respect to 
music copyright.  First, strategic litigation of the type contemplated here is 
                                                     
96 See Jeremy Kidd, Modeling the Likely Effects of Litigation Financing, 47 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 1239, 1268–69 (2016) (“Rent-seeking can also occur . . . through case 
selection.  Each individual who is involved in a lawsuit will, of course, prefer a 
particular outcome.  To the extent that people use the judicial branch to pursue 
personal goals, then, a very soft form of rent-seeking occurs in nearly every case 
and may actually be an integral part of our adversarial system.”). 
97 See id. at 1269 (“As an inherently evolutionary system, the common law seems 
designed to adapt according to judicial rent-seeking pressures, both benign and 
nefarious.  The adaptability of the common law is the foundation for the ‘efficiency 
of the common law’ hypothesis.” (quoting Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law 
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977))). 
98 See Abrams & Chen, supra note 30, at 1107 (“Litigation funding does appear to 
have precedential value.  By two different measures, cases funded by IMF have 
greater importance than those they did not fund, but which proceeded to trial in any 
case.  Funded cases both cite and receive over twice as many references as 
unfunded cases.  If citations are a good proxy for legal precedent, then third-party 
funding appears to promote its more rapid development.”). 
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not rent seeking in the same sense as the deleterious conduct the term 
usually describes.  Traditional critiques of rent seeking focus on ethically 
questionable forms of special-interest advocacy like lobbying.99  But 
litigation finance does not incentivize this type of rent seeking.  Rather, 
because prohibitive litigation costs breed one-sided100 rent seeking by 
blocking judicial access to less-resourced parties101—which is much more 
akin to the traditionally derided types of rent seeking mentioned above—
litigation finance incentivizes efforts to nudge legal precedent back toward 
equilibrium with respect to adversarial parity.  In other words, by opening 
courtroom doors to less-resourced musicians and labels (and leaving them 
open long enough for those parties to obtain judicial decisions in lieu of 
settlements), litigation finance could allow them to bend the arc of 
precedent toward neutral legal principles by strengthening the adverseness 
of viewpoints in music copyright lawsuits throughout the nation.  And this 
adverseness does not just produce one-sided benefits: it is well-established 
that judicial systems demonstrably benefit from robust and thorough 
debate.102   
 Second, the copyright regime itself refutes arguments that increased 
litigation is bad for the courts and the justice system.  As Balganesh points 
out, unlike in other regimes, copyright law largely depends on litigation to 
validate rights.103  Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that prohibitive 
litigation costs fundamentally distort the way that music copyright law is 
                                                     
99 See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 191, 197 (2012) (“Lobbyists threaten national economic welfare in two ways. 
First, lobbyists facilitate activity which economists term rent-seeking.  One 
common form of rent-seeking occurs when individuals or groups devote resources 
to capturing government transfers, rather than putting them to a productive use, and 
lobbyists are often the key actors securing such benefits.  Second, lobbyists tend to 
lobby for legislation that is itself an inefficient use of government resources, such 
as funding the building of a ‘bridge to nowhere.’”). 
100 See Kidd, supra note 96, at 1274 (“Litigants will also be more likely to engage 
in rent-seeking, and those efforts are more likely to be successful, if strategic 
choices are unopposed outside of the individual cases.”). 
101 See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
102 See, e.g., Franklin Prop. Tr. v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d 218, 220–21 (Me. 1981) 
(noting that “concrete adverseness” is “crucial to the illumination of legal issues 
and the proper exercise of judicial power”). 
103 See Balganesh, supra note 33, at 2286–87 (discussing why “[c]opyright law’s 
basic entitlement structure anticipates and operates in the shadow of private 
litigation” and observing that “the copyright entitlement is formally determined for 
the first time only during litigation” meaning that “[l]itigation thus performs more 
than just a remedial function in copyright law—i.e., merely correcting a harm—but 
instead also performs an important constitutive function for the entitlement” 
(emphasis added)). 
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supposed to work.  Here, it is worthwhile to point out concerns over judicial 
economy.  It is certainly true that more litigation clogs up dockets, but in 
light of the need to resort to legal action to vindicate rights, the current 
copyright regime is premised upon a high level of judicial involvement.104  
Hence, concerns over judicial economy cannot rightly be used to discourage 
an access tool like litigation finance that opens doors to the only tribunal 
capable of providing relief to aggrieved parties.  Nevertheless, judicial-
economy concerns certainly counsel in favor of structural reform of the 
current copyright system to make it more accessible and affordable.105  
 Now, this argument holds true only if litigation finance enables and 
promotes an increase in the number of legitimate lawsuits.  Frivolous 
lawsuits are indeed a form of undesirable rent seeking because they waste 
everyone’s time and money, including that of the courts and defendants.106  
If allowed to continue too far, they could also coerce defendants into 
settling in cases in which they are faultless.  They also encourage litigation-
avoidance strategies like those that have already constricted artistic creation 
in the music industry.107   
 But common sense counters the argument that litigation 
finance substantially promotes frivolous litigation.  It would make no 
sense for litigation financiers to fund bogus lawsuits.108  It stands to 
reason that a litigation finance firm facing the all-or-nothing, “go big 
or go home” economic proposition associated with a contingency 
agreement would take extra precautions to make sure that any 
funding application it approves has a realistic chance of succeeding.  
And by definition, a suit that has a realistic chance of succeeding is 
not frivolous.  Not surprisingly, the need to carefully screen funding 
applications has led many firms to require applicants to have already 
                                                     
104 Id. 
105 See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT SMALL CLAIMS: A REPORT 
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2013), https://www.copyright.gov/docs/ 
smallclaims/usco-smallcopyrightclaims.pdf (analyzing and advancing specific 
proposals for the creation of a small claims copyright tribunal to remove many 
copyright claims from federal court and make them more affordable). 
106 Kidd, supra note 83, at 628–29.  
107 See William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on 
Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1889 n.8 
(2003) (“If plaintiffs can extract sizable settlements by filing frivolous lawsuits 
capable of surviving motions to dismiss, potential defendants will avoid engaging 
in any behavior that possibly could be construed as anticompetitive, further 
dampening these firms' incentives to compete aggressively.”). 
108 See Martin, supra note 12, at 77 (“No one is going to invest in a frivolous 
lawsuit because any money thus invested will be lost.”). 
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retained lawyers—lawyers bound by ethical rules not to knowingly 
pursue frivolous lawsuits—to handle their claims at the time of 
application.109  In fact, this has led at least two scholars, Michael 
Abramowicz and Omer Alper, to suggest that properly regulated 
litigation finance agreements can add a useful layer of additional 
gatekeeping on top of those functions contained within the formal 
judicial system110 like motions to dismiss and sanctions. 
C. Historical Analogies 
 Finally, proper judicial rent seeking is nothing new.  In fact, some 
of the key civil-rights developments of the last century resulted at least in 
part from strategic use of litigation to develop beneficial precedent.  First, 
the NAACP’s legendary civil-rights litigation strategies—pioneered by 
Thurgood Marshall—led to a number of landmark decisions, including 
Brown v. Board of Education, which held that school segregation violated 
the Equal Protection Clause.111  Second and more recently, the LGBT-rights 
movement’s nationwide litigation strategy—with the civil-rights legal 
organization Lambda Legal marching at the vanguard—culminated112 in the 
cultural earthquake that was Obergefell v. Hodges,113 in which the Supreme 
Court held that state prohibitions of same-sex marriage violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.114 
 However, these historical analogies also demonstrate that a 
litigation strategy is necessary to effectively seek judicial rent.  Unlike those 
movements, which were coordinated by strong, centralized leadership in the 
form of organized advocacy groups, litigation finance is a populist means, 
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not a populist movement.  In theory, litigation funding is available to anyone 
with a decent legal claim and the time and courage to pursue it.  As a result, 
absent carefully coordinated action, prospective litigants could conceivably 
use third-party funding to harm their own interests by bringing the wrong 
cases in the wrong courts115 or defending bad cases in lieu of settling just as 
much as they could to help them.  Thus, market participants would be well-
served to employ a coherent strategy of targeted planning instead of relying 
on individual participants to bring suits sua sponte.   
 In sum, while litigation finance can help less-resourced market 
participants seek rent, it cannot achieve this in a vacuum.  Nevertheless, 
with a healthy dose of collective action and the right strategy, the model 
stands to play an important role in opening courtroom doors to, and shaping 
precedential development in favor of, those who were previously shut out 
by prohibitive transaction costs. 
CONCLUSION  
 Free markets do not capitulate easily.  Despite the oppressive cost 
of vindicating one’s legal rights, market participants shaped the music 
industry to maximize their ability to cope under the uncertainties and high 
costs of American copyright law.  Yet because the big labels carried the 
most cash and exerted the most influence in times past, they became the 
primary architects of the litigation-avoidance regime. 
 While time has passed and technology has shifted the balance of 
power back towards less-resourced actors, the law has not caught up to new 
realities.  But because litigation finance can advance the cash necessary to 
overcome the system’s intrinsic cost barriers, those actors have the 
opportunity to demand their voices in the courtroom.  With careful planning 
and a degree of coordination, they can use litigation finance as a vehicle to 
push for greater legal clarity and precedent that benefits their interests.  And 
even if the precedent cuts against those interests, the system as a whole can 
only benefit from greater clarity.  Hence, musicians and labels would be 
wise to consider a closer look at the ever-growing phenomenon known as 
litigation finance. 
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